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Note 
DO YOU KNOW WHY I STOPPED YOU?: THE FUTURE OF 
TRAFFIC STOPS IN A POST-HEIEN WORLD 
SARAH RICCIARDI 
Nearly twenty years after the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision 
upholding pretextual traffic stops in Whren v. United States, racial 
animosity between white police officers and black civilians is as 
pervasive as ever.  Reports of unarmed black men killed at the hands 
of white law enforcement officers are becoming disturbingly 
common.  Despite the national outcry against racial discrimination 
by law enforcement, the U.S. Supreme Court recently handed down a 
decision that will broaden police discretion still further.  On 
December 15, 2014, the Court in Heien v. North Carolina held that 
an officer’s mistake of law can provide the reasonable suspicion 
necessary to justify a traffic stop.  This Note argues that this 
expansion of police discretion will disproportionately affect 
minorities, exacerbating the deep mistrust between communities and 
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DO YOU KNOW WHY I STOPPED YOU?: THE FUTURE OF 
TRAFFIC STOPS IN A POST-HEIEN WORLD 
SARAH RICCIARDI  
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Fifty years after the passing of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,1 protests 
over racial discrimination are once again front-page news.2 As evidenced 
by recent nationwide protests, allegations of racism continue to plague 
American streets and courtrooms.3 While overt discrimination has 
drastically declined over the last few decades,4 the tension between white 
law enforcement officers and minority, indigent civilians is still palpable. 
In the past year, there have been two widely publicized incidents in which 
an unarmed black man has tragically died at the hands of a white police 
officer.5 The deaths of Michael Brown, in Ferguson, Missouri,6 and Eric 
Garner, in Staten Island, New York,7 have shaken much of the country. 
These deaths are especially jarring in the wake of the 2013 acquittal of 
                                                                                                                          
 University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D. Candidate 2015; New York University, B.A. 
2005. I would like to thank Drew Alan Hillier, Brendan Gooley, Alex Zeman, and the rest of the 
Connecticut Law Review staff for their invaluable editorial assistance. I would also like to thank Scott 
Garosshen and the Connecticut Moot Court Board for inspiration and guidance.  
1 The Civil Rights Act of 1964 outlawed discrimination and segregation on the ground of race, 
color, religion, or national origin in places of public accommodation. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 
(1964). 
2 See, e.g., J. David Goodman & Al Baker, New York Officer Facing No Charges in Chokehold 
Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2014, at A1 (describing protests and demonstrations after a grand jury 
decided not to indict the police officer for Eric Garner’s death); Rebecca Davis O’Brien et al., Protests 
Erupt After Officer Not Indicted in New York Case, WALL ST. J., Dec. 4, 2014, at A1 (reporting the 
“renew[al] . . . of protests that swept the country after another black man was fatally shot by an officer 
in Missouri”). 
3 See Paula Mejia, Ferguson, Eric Garner Protests Spread Worldwide, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 6, 2014, 
12:53 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/ferguson-eric-garner-protests-sprawl-worldwide-289867 
(“[P]rotests[] which demand a focus on civil rights and accountability for police brutality . . . went on 
in Oakland, Chicago, Boston, Las Vegas, Los Angeles, Washington D.C. and New Orleans.”). 
4 See, e.g., Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2625–28 (2013) (declaring the Section 4 
coverage formula of the Voting Rights Act unconstitutional in light of current conditions, specifically 
that the “Nation has made great strides” in ending racial discrimination in voting). 
5 See O’Brien et al., supra note 2, at A1 (noting that the New York grand jury’s failure to indict 
the officer in the Eric Garner case was only “a little more than a week after a grand jury in Missouri 
declined to indict a white police officer, Darren Wilson, who shot an unarmed black 18-year old, 
Michael Brown, in August”).  
6 Id. 
7 Deborah E. Bloom & Jareen Imam, New York Man Dies After Chokehold By Police, CNN (DEC. 
8, 2014, 5:31 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/07/20/justice/ny-chokehold-death/. 
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George Zimmerman, a white neighborhood watch coordinator who shot 
and killed an unarmed black teenager in 2012.8 
Since the Brown and Garner deaths, protests have erupted across the 
U.S.—many of which have escalated into violent riots.9 While there were 
demonstrations immediately following the incidents, it was the reaction to 
the failed indictments of the officers involved that caused the most 
outcry.10 The general sentiment of the protestors appears to be that the 
grand juries’ denials are “yet another injustice for blacks.”11 In response to 
the frustrations raised by many African Americans with respect to a legal 
system with a long history of discrimination against black people, 
President Obama acknowledged, “[w]hen anybody in this country is not 
being treated equally under the law, that is a problem . . . and it’s my job as 
president to help solve it.”12 While President Obama’s promise is 
encouraging, it is the judiciary that may be to blame for the ongoing racial 
discrimination by police officers.  
Just weeks after the failed indictments, the United States Supreme 
Court handed down a decision, Heien v. North Carolina,13 that will 
potentially broaden police discretion in the context of investigatory traffic 
stops. As these types of stops already disproportionately affect minority 
drivers,14 this decision will very likely add to the growing tension between 
minorities and law enforcement. While the issues facing the grand juries in 
                                                                                                                          
8 Lizette Alvarez & Cara Buckley, Zimmerman Is Acquitted in Trayvon Martin Killing, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 14, 2013, at A1. As George Zimmerman was a civilian at the time of the shooting, the 
Trayvon Martin case is not particularly relevant to this Note’s discussion of actions taken by police 
officers. However, it does highlight issues that continue to face minority men when dealing with 
authority figures. See, e.g., Devlin Barrett, Holder Criticizes Stand-Your-Ground Laws; Speech 
Drawing Link to Teen’s Death Marks Attorney General’s First Rebuke of Such Statutes; Gun-Rights 
Groups Rankled, WALL ST. J. ONLINE (July 16, 2013), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001 
424127887324348504578610113097977142 (reporting that after Martin’s death last year, Eric Holder, 
the nation’s first black attorney general, “sat down with his 15-year-old son and discussed how to 
respond if he were stopped by police, just as his own father had done with him decades earlier,” and 
noting that “[t]his was a father-son tradition [he] hoped would not need to be handed down”).   
9 See Monica Davey & Julie Bosman, Grand Jury Declines to Indict Police Officer in Ferguson 
Killing, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2014, at A1 (“Bottles and rocks were thrown at officers, and windows of 
businesses were smashed. Several police cars were burned; buildings . . . were on fire, and looting was 
reported in several businesses. Gunshots could be heard along the streets of Ferguson, and law 
enforcement authorities deployed smoke and gas to control the crowds.”). 
10 Id.; Goodman & Baker, supra note 2, at A1. 
11 Jack Healy, Ferguson, Still Tense, Grows Calmer, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2014, at A24. Indeed, 
the slogan “black lives matter,” which was originally created in 2012 after the acquittal of George 
Zimmerman, has been revived as the motto against racial inequality. Mejia, supra note 3. 
12 Goodman & Baker, supra note 2, at A1. 
13 135 S. Ct. 530 (2014). 
14 According to a 2011 survey published by the Justice Department, black drivers are 31 percent 
more likely to be pulled over than white drivers, and about 23 percent more likely than Hispanic 
drivers. See LYNN LANGTON & MATTHEW DUROSE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, POLICE BEHAVIOR DURING TRAFFIC AND STREET STOPS, 2011 1 (2013) (reporting that 13% of 
drivers who were pulled over in a traffic stop were black, 10% were white, and 10% were Hispanic).   
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the Brown and Garner incidents and the Supreme Court in Heien were 
factually and legally different,15 the cases share common questions. What 
were the police officer’s subjective intentions at the time? Does it matter? 
And should it matter? 
The difficulty in answering these questions lies in the fact that courts 
have yet to achieve omniscience. What is truly on the minds of parties 
involved in lawsuits remains unknown. Did the supermarket owner know 
about the spill and choose not to clean it up?16 Did the taxpayer really not 
know that his wages were considered income under the Tax Code?17 Did 
the officer actually stop the car with discriminatory intent?18 Did the 
defendant truly fear for his life?19 In response, the legal system has done its 
best to create mechanisms to determine when and how the state of mind of 
an individual should be considered.   
For example, negligence was created to “coordinate conduct within [a] 
community safely.”20 Communities adopt rules and practices that give 
members guidance as to how to act in certain situations.21 With these pre-
existing social conventions in place, it does not matter whether an 
individual actually knew he was committing a violation.22 Under the law of 
                                                                                                                          
15 The Garner and Brown cases involved officers being charged with manslaughter, among other 
things. Rich Calder & Selim Algar, ‘Reckless’ Omission in Garner Case, N.Y. POST, Dec. 6, 2014, at 4; 
Julie Bosman et al., Amid Conflicting Accounts, Trusting the Officer, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2014, at 
A1. Both were decided at the indictment stage. Bosman et al., supra note 15, at A1.; Calder & Algar, 
supra note 15, at 4. The Heien case dealt with the reasonable suspicion standard as it pertains to traffic 
stops. Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 534. The judgment up for appeal was over the suppression of evidence 
obtained from a search following the stop. Id. at 535. 
16 See, e.g., Negri v. Stop & Shop, Inc., 480 N.E.2d 740, 741 (N.Y. 1985) (holding that a grocery 
store owner may be liable if he has constructive notice of a dangerous condition, regardless of whether 
he actually knew about it or not). 
17 See, e.g., Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 201 (1991) (noting that criminal tax liability 
requires willfulness, i.e., that “the defendant knew of the duty purportedly imposed by the provision of 
the statute or regulation he is accused of violating”). 
18 See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (holding that “the constitutional 
reasonableness of traffic stops [does not] depend[] on the actual motivations of the individual officers 
involved”); infra Part V (discussing police officer motivations during traffic stops). 
19 See, e.g., United States v. Wagner, 834 F.2d 1474, 1486 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that defendant 
was not entitled to instruction on self-defense because the victim’s “alleged attempt to grab the hot 
water pitcher did not justify [the defendant’s act of] pulling a knife after all danger had passed”); see 
also Alvarez & Buckley, supra note 8, at A1 (reporting that the six-woman jury acquitted George 
Zimmerman of the killing of Trayvon Martin in Florida, where self-defense laws “allow someone with 
a reasonable fear of great bodily harm or death to use lethal force, even if retreating from danger is an 
option”).   
20 Patrick J. Kelley, Restating Duty, Breach, and Proximate Cause in Negligence Law: 
Descriptive Theory and the Rule of Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1039, 1063 (2001). 
21 Id. at 1064.  
22 See id. (noting that cases are decided based on the “pre-existing social convention[s]” within 
the community). 
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negligence, he simply should have known.23  
The rule against hearsay24 (and its exceptions) is another mechanism 
employed to deal with the unreachable subjective mind of individuals. 
Generally, hearsay is inadmissible because of an inherent lack of 
trustworthiness.25 But in certain situations, courts may overlook that 
untrustworthiness.26 For example, Federal Rule of Evidence 803(1), the 
“present sense impression” exception, allows into evidence a “statement 
describing or explaining an event or condition, made while or immediately 
after the declarant perceived it.”27 According to the Advisory Committee’s 
Note, the rationale for such an exception is that if a statement describing an 
event is made near the time of the event, it negates “the likelihood of 
deliberate or conscious misrepresentation.”28 Even though it is entirely 
possible that the declarant was lying when he made the statement, because 
he made it near the time of the event, courts presume it was true.29 
Naturally, society’s attempts to deal with subjectivity often create 
inconsistencies in its treatment by the law. Such inconsistencies are 
                                                                                                                          
23 See, e.g., Trimarco v. Klein, 436 N.E.2d 502, 505 (N.Y. 1982) (noting “the well-recognized and 
pragmatic proposition that when ‘certain dangers have been removed by a customary way of doing 
things safely, this custom may be proved to show that [the one charged with the dereliction] has fallen 
below the required standard’”) (citation omitted). 
24 Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. FED. R. 
EVID. 801(c).   
25 See James Donald Moorehead, Compromising the Hearsay Rule: The Fallacy of Res Gestae 
Reliability, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 203, 246 (1995) (“[The hearsay rule] protects against the errant or 
fabricated statements of remote declarants and in-court witnesses, and it helps to ensure that the jury 
does not base its decision on untested hearsay. Because the declarant is not subject to cross-
examination, there must be additional guarantors of trustworthiness to take its place before hearsay 
should be admitted.”); see also United States v. Boyce, 742 F.3d 792, 800 (7th Cir. 2014) (Posner, J., 
concurring) (noting that hearsay is often “no better than rumor or gossip”). 
26 Boyce, 742 F.3d at 800 (Posner, J., concurring) (discussing exceptions to the rule against 
hearsay). 
27 FED. R. EVID. 803(1). Though codified by the Rules of Evidence, many of these exceptions are 
the result of “folk psychology.” See Lust v. Sealy, Inc., 383 F.3d 580, 588 (7th Cir. 2004) (critiquing 
the rationale behind the present sense impression exception); see also Boyce, 742 F.3d at 801 (Posner, 
J., concurring) (noting that the present sense impression “has neither a theoretical nor an empirical 
basis; and it’s not even common sense—it’s not even good folk psychology”).  
28 FED. R. EVID. 801 advisory committee’s note. 
29 Boyce, 742 F.3d at 800 (Posner, J., concurring).  Judge Posner strongly criticized this rationale 
in his concurring opinion in Boyce.   
Even real immediacy is not a guarantor of truthfulness. It’s not true that people can’t 
make up a lie in a short period of time. Most lies in fact are 
spontaneous. . . . Suppose I run into an acquaintance on the street and he has a new 
dog with him—a little yappy thing—and he asks me, “Isn’t he beautiful?” I answer 
yes, though I’m a cat person and consider his dog hideous. 
Id. Posner went on to similarly criticize the “excited utterance” exception, noting that “even if a person 
is so excited by something that he loses the capacity for reflection (which doubtless does happen), how 
can there be any confidence that his unreflective utterance, provoked by excitement, is reliable?” Id. at 
801. 
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particularly glaring with respect to cases involving law enforcement. The 
arguments presented in Heien specifically contemplated the difference 
between how courts treat the state of mind of a civilian defendant and the 
state of mind of a law enforcement officer. The question before the Heien 
Court was whether an officer’s mistake of law could provide reasonable 
suspicion to justify a traffic stop.30 At first blush, the question seems easily 
answerable. Fourth Amendment precedent suggests that police officers 
may make mistakes as long as their actions are reasonable under the 
circumstances.31 As Petitioner Nicholas Brady Heien contended, however, 
there is a strong argument that mistakes of law should be considered per se 
unreasonable and therefore a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Indeed, 
eight circuits have ruled that mistakes of law generally cannot provide the 
basis for reasonable suspicion.32 
Using Heien as a guidepost, this Note will analyze the treatment of a 
police officer’s state of mind in the context of Fourth Amendment 
violations. Part II will provide a factual context for the forthcoming legal 
analysis by describing the relevant facts of Heien. Part III will discuss 
various arguments posed by both parties. In particular, it will address 
Heien’s contention that the “ignorance is no excuse” doctrine suggests that 
a police officer should be required to know the law as well as a civilian. It 
will also discuss the Court’s previous treatment of a police officer’s state 
of mind in the context of the Fourth Amendment, specifically addressing 
cases involving mistakes of fact. Part IV will discuss the Supreme Court’s 
opinion and the potential implications of its ruling in light of the civil 
unrest surrounding the failed indictments in Ferguson and Staten Island. 
This Note will conclude by suggesting that the Supreme Court’s sanction 
of an expansion of police discretion will disproportionately affect 
minorities and will likely fan the fire of public outrage. 
                                                                                                                          
30 Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 534 (2014). 
31 See, e.g., Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 185–86 (1990) (noting that factual determinations 
made by law enforcement officers need only be reasonable, not correct). 
32 See State v. Heien, 737 S.E.2d 351, 360 (N.C. 2012) [hereinafter Heien II] (Hudson, J., 
dissenting) (accumulating circuit case law). Specifically: 
The First, Third, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits all apply 
some form of the rule that an officer’s mistake of law cannot be the basis for 
reasonable suspicion, though many allow that a stop based on a mistake of law may 
be constitutional if it can be justified objectively notwithstanding the mistake of law. 
Id. (citing United States v. Debruhl, 38 A.3d 293, 299 (D.C. Cir. 2012); United States v. Coplin, 463 
F.3d 96, 101 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v. Mosley, 454 F.3d 249, 260 n.16 (3d Cir. 2006); United 
States v. McDonald, 453 F.3d 958, 961 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Tibbetts, 396 F.3d 1132, 1138 
(10th Cir. 2005); United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1279 (11th Cir. 2003); United States 
v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Miller, 146 F.3d 274, 279 (5th 
Cir. 1998)). 
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II.  HEIEN V. NORTH CAROLINA 
A.  Factual Background 
On the morning of April 29, 2009, Petitioner Nicholas Brady Heien 
and Maynor Javier Vasquez were traveling along Interstate 77 through 
Surry County, North Carolina.33 Vasquez was driving Heien’s car, a Ford 
Escort, while Heien lay across the back seat.34 At that time, Sergeant Matt 
Darisse of the Surry County Sheriff’s Department was working criminal 
interdiction, observing traffic on the same interstate.35 At the time of the 
traffic stop in question, Sergeant Darisse had worked in Surry County law 
enforcement for twenty years, the last two of which he spent doing 
criminal interdiction.36 
When the Escort approached, it appeared to Sergeant Darisse that 
Vasquez was “stiff and nervous” so he decided to follow the vehicle.37 As 
traffic slowed, Sergeant Darisse noticed that the vehicle’s left rear brake 
light illuminated but the right rear brake light did not.38 Sergeant Darisse 
activated his blue lights and stopped the vehicle.39 Darisse informed 
Vasquez that he had stopped the vehicle due to a faulty brake light.40 
Unbeknownst to Sergeant Darisse, North Carolina law required vehicles to 
have only one functioning brake light.41 At the time of the stop, no North 
Carolina appellate court had interpreted the statute one way or the other.42 
Sergeant Darisse simply assumed that the law required two functioning 
brake lights.43 
After finding no problems with Vasquez’s license and registration, 
Sergeant Darisse issued Vasquez a warning ticket for the malfunctioning 
brake light.44 Sergeant Darisse then asked Vasquez some additional 
questions, including whether he could search the vehicle.45 Vasquez 
                                                                                                                          
33 Joint Appendix at 4, Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530 (2014) (No. 13–604) [hereinafter 
Joint Appendix].    
34 Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 534 (2014). 
35 Id.    
36 Joint Appendix, supra note 33, at 14.    
37 Brief for Petitioner at 2, Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530 (2014) (No. 13–604) 
[hereinafter Brief for Petitioner]. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 3. 
41 State v. Heien, 714 S.E.2d 827, 829 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011) [hereinafter Heien I]; see also Heien 
v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 535 (2014) (“Noting that the State had chosen not to seek review of 
the Court of Appeals’ interpretation of the vehicle code, the North Carolina Supreme Court 
assumed . . . that the faulty brake light was not a violation.”).  
42 Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 540 (citing Heien II, 737 S.E.2d at 359). 
43 Id. at 534. 
44 Id.  
45 Id. 
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responded that he did not mind but that it was not his car.46 Sergeant 
Darisse then asked Heien, who verbally consented to the search.47 The 
search of the vehicle revealed a sandwich bag filled with cocaine.48   
B.  Procedural Posture 
On September 24, 2009, the State of North Carolina charged Heien 
with attempted cocaine trafficking.49 Contending that the initial traffic stop 
violated the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches 
and seizures, Heien moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the 
search of his vehicle.50 On March 25, 2010, the trial court denied Heien’s 
motion to suppress.51 In making its ruling, the court assumed that North 
Carolina law required two functioning brake lights.52 Heien pled guilty to 
attempted cocaine trafficking, but reserved the right to appeal the court’s 
denial of his motion to suppress.53 He was sentenced to two consecutive 
ten-to-twelve month prison terms.54   
On August 16, 2011, the North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the 
trial court’s decision and vacated the conviction, holding that Sergeant 
Darisse “could not have had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the 
malfunctioning brake light constituted a violation of [North Carolina law]” 
because North Carolina General Statute Section 20-129 required only one 
functioning brake light and no other statute applied.55 The State appealed 
to the North Carolina Supreme Court, conceding the Court of Appeals’ 
interpretation of Section 20-129 but arguing that the traffic stop still did 
not violate the Fourth Amendment because an objectively reasonable 
mistake of law can provide reasonable suspicion.56   
Thus, the North Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case under the 
assumption that the law required only one functioning brake light.57 The 
North Carolina Supreme Court reversed, remanding the case back to the 
Court of Appeals to decide whether Heien’s consent to search his car was 
invalid.58 Both the North Carolina Court of Appeals and the North Carolina 
                                                                                                                          
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 Id.  
49 Joint Appendix, supra note 33, at 1. 
50 Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 535. 
51 Joint Appendix, supra note 33, at 1. 
52 Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 535 (noting that the trial court did not decide whether two lights were 
required). 
53 Id. 
54 Heien I, 714 S.E.2d 827, 827 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011) .   
55 Id. at 831.   
56 Heien II, 737 S.E.2d 351, 354 (N.C. 2012) .   
57 Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 535. 
58 Id.    
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Supreme Court held that Heien’s consent was valid.59 Heien abandoned the 
consent issue and petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for certiorari. On 
April 21, 2014, the Supreme Court granted review of the question: 
“Whether a police officer’s mistake of law can provide the individualized 
suspicion that the Fourth Amendment requires to justify a traffic stop.”60 
C.  Relevant Law 
The Supreme Court has continually recognized that “[n]o right is held 
more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the 
right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, 
free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and 
unquestionable authority of law.”61 The Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution provides in relevant part: “The right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated.”62 The Fourteenth Amendment 
makes this protection applicable to the states.63    
To preserve these constitutional protections, the Supreme Court 
established standards by which police officers must abide. Ordinarily, an 
arrest requires both: (i) probable cause to believe that the person 
committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime; and (ii) either a 
warrant or exigent circumstances requiring immediate action before a 
warrant could be obtained.64 But for a brief investigatory stop, a police 
officer needs only a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal 
activity.65 In those cases, “[a] police officer must be able to point to 
specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences 
from those facts, reasonably warrant [an] intrusion.”66   
“Temporary detention of individuals during the stop of an automobile 
by the police . . . constitutes a ‘seizure’ of ‘persons’ within the meaning of 
[the Fourth Amendment].”67 As such, a traffic stop is “subject to the 
constitutional imperative that it not be ‘unreasonable’ under the 
circumstances”68 and is valid only if the officers have an objectively 
reasonable suspicion to believe that a law is being violated.69 Thus, a 
traffic stop without probable cause or reasonable suspicion is a violation of 
                                                                                                                          
59 Id. 
60 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 37, at i. 
61 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (citation omitted).   
62 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.   
63 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).   
64 Terry, 392 U.S. at 20.   
65 Id. at 20–21.   
66 Id. at 21.   
67 Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809–10 (1996).   
68 Id. at 810. 
69 Terry, 392 U.S. at 20–21.   
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the Fourth Amendment.   
Any evidence obtained thereafter is excluded as fruit of the poisonous 
tree unless it is sufficiently attenuated from that violation or subject to an 
exception.70 The good-faith exception provides that suppression is not 
appropriate when police officers act with “an objectively reasonable good-
faith belief that their conduct is lawful.”71  
In North Carolina, motor vehicles must have at least one functioning 
rear brake light.72 Section 20-129(d) of the North Carolina General Statutes 
provides in relevant part:  “Rear Lamps.—Every motor vehicle . . . shall 
have all originally equipped rear lamps or the equivalent in good working 
order . . . .”73 Subsection (g) provides: 
No person shall sell or operate on the highways of the State 
any motor vehicle, motorcycle or motor-driven cycle, 
manufactured after December 31, 1955, unless it shall be 
equipped with a stop lamp on the rear of the vehicle. The 
stop lamp shall display a red or amber light visible from a 
distance of not less than 100 feet to the rear in normal 
sunlight, and shall be actuated upon application of the service 
(foot) brake. The stop lamp may be incorporated into a unit 
with one or more other rear lamps.74 
In addition, North Carolina General Statute Section 20-183.3(a) 
provides:   
Safety.—A safety inspection of a motor vehicle consists of 
an inspection of the following equipment to determine if the 
vehicle has the equipment required by . . . this Chapter and if 
the equipment is in a safe operating condition: . . . (2) Lights, 





                                                                                                                          
70 See, e.g., United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1280–81 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding 
that the trial court erred in admitting evidence obtained following an unlawful traffic stop).   
71 Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2427 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
72 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-129(d), (g) (2009). 
73 Id. § 20-128(d) (emphasis added). 
74 Id. § 20-128(g) (emphasis added). 
75 Id. § 20-183.3(a). 
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III.  ARGUMENTS 
Due to a divergence of state and federal law, Heien’s position before 
the Supreme Court appears counterintuitive. Typically, the end goal of an 
appeal of a denial of a motion to suppress is for the higher court to hold 
that there was a reversible error—i.e., the case is remanded back to the trial 
court for proceedings consistent with the higher court’s opinion.76 In this 
case, however, Heien sought a clarification of federal law so that, when his 
case was remanded back to state court, he would receive a state remedy in 
light of the clarified federal law.77   
Federal courts (and many state courts) apply a “good-faith exception” 
in cases where evidence was obtained in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment but there was no flagrant police misconduct.78 Under the 
good-faith exception, wrongfully obtained evidence that would normally 
be suppressed is admitted.79 In this particular case, there was no allegation 
of misconduct on the part of Officer Darisse.80 Even if the Supreme Court 
were to find that there was a violation of the Fourth Amendment, the 
evidence would still be admitted under federal law.   
However, at the time the charges were filed against Heien, North 
Carolina did not recognize a good-faith exception.81 Heien thus had to 
argue that the “reasonableness” of mistakes of law should be limited to the 
remedy issue in preparation for the case’s remand to the North Carolina 
Supreme Court.82 Rather than seek a judgment on the exclusion of the 
evidence, Heien asked the U.S. Supreme Court to limit its analysis to the 
issue of whether there was a Fourth Amendment violation in the first 
place.83 Given that agenda, the main thrust behind Heien’s argument was 
                                                                                                                          
76 See, e.g., Florence v. State, 670 So. 2d 135, 136 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (concluding that it 
was error to deny the motion to suppress, reversing and remanding). 
77 Heien II, 737 S.E.2d 351, 361 (N.C. 2012) (Hudson, J., dissenting). 
78 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 911 (1984) (noting that “an assessment of the flagrancy of 
the police misconduct constitutes an important step in the calculus”).   
79 Id. 
80 Brief for the Respondent at 38, Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530 (2014) (No. 13-604) 
[hereinafter Brief for the Respondent].  
81 See State v. Carter, 370 S.E.2d 553, 562 (N.C. 1988) (“We are not persuaded on the facts 
before us that we should engraft a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule under our state 
constitution.”).  In 2011, the General Assembly indicated that the North Carolina Supreme Court revisit 
Carter by enacting a statutory “good faith exception.”  N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A–974 (2011).  
82 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 37, at 29–33. 
83 Id. During oral argument, Justice Scalia made it pretty clear that the Court was not buying the 
argument:  
[W]e don’t review opinions. We review judgments, we review results. What you’re 
complaining about here is the admission of what was discovered in the search of the 
car, right? Now, what difference does it make whether that was lawfully admitted 
because it was a constitutional search or it was lawfully admitted because the 
remedy of excluding it would not be applied if there was a mistake of law . . . ? We 
don’t review analyses. We review judgments. You’re – you’re urging that this 
 
 2015] DO YOU KNOW WHY I STOPPED YOU? 1087 
that all mistakes of law are per se violations of the Fourth Amendment.84   
North Carolina countered with Justice Ginsburg’s famous proposition 
that the “touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.”85 The 
State argued that bifurcating the analysis was unnecessary.86 As long as 
police officers act reasonably, evidence obtained via a search or seizure 
should not be excluded.87 While it seems as though Heien had an uphill 
battle, there are legitimate reasons as to why allowing mistakes of law 
would be unwise in light of the nation’s current climate. The following 
sections discuss some of the issues the Court faced in Heien.   
A.  The “Ignorance Is No Excuse” Doctrine 
One of the more facially attractive arguments raised by Heien was 
based on the premise that law enforcement officers should be required to 
know the law at least as well as civilians. Common law has long 
recognized that officers are responsible for knowing the correct 
interpretation of the law. Prior to the adoption of the exclusionary rule, 
Fourth Amendment violations were enforced under tort law.88 At common 
law, officers were held liable for mistakes of law regardless of 
reasonableness.89 Today, there is a presumption that law enforcement 
officers know the law. It is their job to identify infractions and to take 
proper action.  
Our justice system holds civilians to that same standard. “[T]he 
background presumption [is] that every citizen knows the law . . . .”90 
Accordingly, the “traditional rule” is that “ignorance of the law is no 
excuse.”91 It is not only unfair but also illogical to hold civilians to a higher 
                                                                                                                          
conviction has to be set aside. That’s what we’re reviewing, the conviction, not the 
opinion. 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 12–13, 20–21, Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530 (2014) (No. 13-
604). 
84 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 83, at 12–23. 
85 Brief for the Respondent, supra note 80, at 11 (citing United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 
118 (2001)). 
86 Id. at 26, 27–30. Further, Heien’s focus on per se violations does little to simplify the analysis 
of mistakes of law. Rather than eliminate the reasonableness inquiry altogether, Heien simply imports 
the reasonableness inquiry into the remedial analysis. Moreover, Heien’s approach adds an additional 
step of analysis to determine whether the mistake was indeed of law or fact. With no administrative 
benefit to justify it, Heien’s approach is a poor substitute for the longstanding tradition of evaluating 
reasonableness in one succinct inquiry. 
87 Id. at 26–30. 
88 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 670 (1961) (Douglas, J., concurring) (stating a tort cause of 
action may be applied in a Fourth Amendment situation). 
89 See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 121 cmt. i (2014) (“[A]n officer is not privileged to 
arrest another whom he reasonably suspects of having committed an act which the officer, through a 
mistake of law reasonable in one of his position, believes to be a common law felony.”).   
90 Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 193 (1998).   
91 Id. at 196.   
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standard than law enforcement officers.92 To permit mistakes of law to 
justify traffic stops is to say that a police officer, when driving as a citizen, 
has a duty to know every nuance of the traffic code, but the instant he dons 
his badge he has no such responsibility.   
While this argument has what the Supreme Court described as a 
“rhetorical appeal,”93 the “ignorance is no excuse” doctrine does not reach 
as far as Heien suggests. The maxim “ignorance of the law is no excuse” is 
a legal doctrine that ensures uniformity in criminal prosecution.94 
However, as North Carolina pointed out, it is “subject to numerous 
exceptions and qualifications.”95 Many crimes require some form of intent. 
For example, “willfulness,” which includes an element of knowledge, is 
often a requirement for tax convictions.96         
Heien’s argument further ignores a fundamental distinction between 
determining reasonable suspicion in the field versus assessing criminal 
liability in a courtroom.97 The ignorance-of-the-law doctrine serves as a 
litigation tool, aiding in the prosecution of criminals. There is no need for 
such a tool outside the courtroom. At the inception of a traffic stop, 
ultimate criminal liability is not the issue.  
As the Supreme Court ultimately explained, “[j]ust as an individual 
generally cannot escape criminal liability based on a mistaken 
understanding of the law, so too the government cannot impose criminal 
liability based on a mistaken understanding of the law.”98 Had the law 
required two functioning brake lights, Heien could not have been relieved 
of liability by claiming ignorance, and similarly, had the law required only 
one brake light, Officer Darisse could not have issued a ticket because he 
reasonably thought the law required two. The Court concluded that “[j]ust 
because mistakes of law cannot justify either the imposition or the 
avoidance of criminal liability, it does not follow that they cannot justify 
                                                                                                                          
92 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 37, at 17–18 (“It takes little reflection to see the ‘fundamental 
unfairness’ of holding citizens to that maxim ‘while allowing those entrusted to enforce the law to be 
ignorant of it.’” (quoting United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1280 (11th Cir. 2003))). 
Indeed, “failure to understand the law by the very person charged with enforcing it is not objectively 
reasonable.” Id. at 18 (quoting United States v. Tibbetts, 396 F.3d 1132, 1138 (10th Cir. 2005) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
93 Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 540 (2014). 
94 Arthur Leavens, Beyond Blame—Mens Rea and Regulatory Crime, 46 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 
1, 21 (2007). 
95 Brief for the Respondent, supra note 80, at 23 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
96 See, e.g., Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 201 (1991) (noting that criminal tax liability 
requires willfulness, i.e., that “the defendant knew of the duty purportedly imposed by the provision of 
the statute or regulation he is accused of violating”). 
97 Brief for the Respondent, supra note 80, at 24 (noting that Heien “confuses the crime that 
prompted the initial stop and the crime of arrest”). 
98 Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 540; Brief for the Respondent, supra note 80, at 24.  
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an investigatory stop.”99 However, this reasoning does not contribute much 
to answer the question of why mistakes of law should justify an 
investigatory stop at all.   
B.  “Reasonableness” Standard 
North Carolina’s position was essentially that a traffic stop is justified 
even if a police officer makes a mistake of law as long as it is a reasonable 
one. As previously noted, “[t]he touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is 
reasonableness . . . .”100 The Fourth Amendment’s purpose “is to impose a 
standard of ‘reasonableness’ upon the exercise of discretion by government 
officials, including law enforcement agents in order ‘to safeguard the 
privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions.’”101 Courts 
recognize that the reasonableness standard is a “fluid concept” that applies 
to the analysis of all potential Fourth Amendment violations.102 Rather than 
delineate bright line rules to distinguish between reasonable and 
unreasonable behavior, the Supreme Court has held that “[e]ach case is to 
be decided on its own facts and circumstances.”103 Reasonable suspicion 
cannot be “reduced to a neat set of legal rules” for it is a “commonsense, 
nontechnical conception[] that deal[s] with the factual and practical 
considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not 
legal technicians, act.”104 Thus, reasonable suspicion requires only “some 
minimal level of objective justification.”105 Sergeant Darisse’s objective 
                                                                                                                          
99 Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 540. Importantly, Heien’s appeal was not a challenge of a traffic ticket – 
rather it was a challenge of the validity of the initial traffic stop. Id. Heien made a similar argument, in 
which he conflated criminal liability and reasonable suspicion, with respect to the rule of lenity. Brief 
for Petitioner, supra note 37, at 18. Essentially, he claimed that if any ambiguity existed with respect to 
the traffic code, it should have been construed in such a way as to limit the interference with personal 
liberty. Id. If the general rule is that legislatures cannot draft ambiguous criminal statutes and any 
ambiguity should be construed in favor of lenity, then charges resulting from an officer’s finding of 
reasonable suspicion based on an ambiguous law should also be resolved in favor of lenity. Id. 
However, like the ignorance-of-the-law doctrine, this particular legal mechanism applies to criminal 
liability with respect to the crime charged. See Brief for the Respondent, supra note 80, at 25 (“The 
rule of lenity and related canons could have affected how the North Carolina courts interpreted the 
state’s brake light provision. But that was not the offense for which petitioner was held criminally 
liable.”).  Had Heien been tried for insufficient brake lights, the rule of lenity may have provided him a 
defense by arguing that the traffic law was unclear or ambiguous. Id. at 24–25. When an officer stops a 
vehicle based on his reasonable mistake in interpreting an ambiguous law, the driver is not subject to 
liability pursuant to the ambiguous law or the officer’s interpretation of it. Id. at 24. Here, Heien was 
charged with cocaine possession and trafficking under a clear statute—not a malfunctioning brake light 
under an ambiguous one.  
100 United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001). 
101 Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653–54 (1979) (citing Marshall v. Barlow’s Inc., 436 U.S. 
307, 312 (1978) (emphasis added)).   
102 Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996). 
103 Id. (citation omitted) 
104 Id. at 695–96 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
105 United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (citation omitted). 
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justification was a reasonable interpretation of an unclear traffic code. 
However, as Heien points out, under the Fourth Amendment, an 
investigatory stop is permissible only if supported by reasonable suspicion 
of criminal activity.106 By logical extension, a traffic stop based on 
suspicion of conduct that is not actually criminal is by its very nature 
unreasonable. Fourth Amendment jurisprudence requires that, when 
determining whether reasonable suspicion exists, the facts known to the 
officer must be measured against the correct interpretation of the law. The 
reasonable suspicion standard implicated by a law enforcement officer’s 
investigatory stop represents a balance between “the need to search (or 
seize) [and] the invasion which the search (or seizure) entails.”107 The 
Supreme Court described reasonable suspicion as “a particularized and 
objective basis for suspecting the person stopped of criminal activity.”108 
Without such criminal activity, reasonable suspicion cannot exist.    
Whether reasonable suspicion exists turns on “whether the rule of law 
as applied to the established facts is or is not violated.”109 The 
determination is simple: “either the law was violated and the stop is 
reasonable, or the law was not violated and the stop is not reasonable.”110 
Indeed, “[w]hat matters . . . are the facts as viewed by an objectively 
reasonable officer, and the rule of law—not an officer’s conception of the 
rule of law, and not even an officer’s reasonable misunderstanding about 
the law, but the law.”111 It is undisputed that North Carolina law only 
requires one functioning rear brake light and that Sergeant Darisse initiated 
the traffic stop upon observing “the right brake light of the vehicle 
not . . . function[ing].”112 With no law broken, Sergeant Darisse had no 
legal authority to warrant an intrusion on Heien’s constitutional rights.  
C.  Practicalities 
In addition to finding support in the text of the Fourth Amendment, 
North Carolina was also quick to point out the practical benefits of 
applying a fluid standard to evaluate police conduct. The reasonableness 
standard allows law enforcement officers to make determinations based on 
the circumstances in front of them without requiring them to be 
omniscient. As the North Carolina Supreme Court recognized, “[t]o require 
our law enforcement officers to accurately forecast how a reviewing court 
will interpret the substantive law at issue would transform this 
                                                                                                                          
106 Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 693, 696.   
107 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (citation omitted).   
108 Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 696 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).   
109 Id. at 697 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).   
110 Heien II, 737 S.E.2d 351, 360 (N.C. 2012) (Hudson, J., dissenting).  
111 Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 542 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
112 Heien II, 737 S.E.2d at 353.   
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commonsense, nontechnical conception into something that requires much 
more than some minimal level of objective justification.”113  
Indeed, “[t]he Supreme Court of the United States does not demand 
factual accuracy from our police when determining whether reasonable 
suspicion exists.”114 To satisfy this standard “what is generally demanded 
of the many factual determinations that must regularly be made by agents 
of the government . . . is not that they always be correct, but that they 
always be reasonable.”115 Thus, courts universally uphold searches and 
seizures based on reasonable mistakes of fact.116   
Similarly, courts have long refused to punish officers for reasonably 
relying on the flawed judgment of others. In the English case Carratt v. 
Morley,117 the court held that an officer was liable for false imprisonment 
where he seized the plaintiff under a facially void warrant.118 But the court 
observed that had the warrant been “even substantially good” in form, 
though still invalid, it would have provided the officer a defense.119 Today, 
evidence obtained as a result of officers’ reasonable, but mistaken, reliance 
on third-party judgments is generally admissible.120 Most recently, in 
Michigan v. DeFillippo,121 the Court declined to suppress evidence that 
was obtained pursuant to a subsequently invalidated ordinance.122 In that 
                                                                                                                          
113 Id. at 357 (internal quotation marks omitted). See, e.g., Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 
37–38 (1979) (“A prudent officer, in the course of determining whether respondent had committed an 
offense under all the circumstances shown by this record, should not have been required to anticipate 
that a court would later hold the [violated] ordinance unconstitutional.”); United States v. Martin, 411 
F.3d 998, 1001 (8th Cir. 2005) (“We should not expect state highway patrolmen to interpret the traffic 
laws with the subtlety and expertise of a criminal defense attorney.” (citation omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).   
114 Heien II, 737 S.E.2d at 358.   
115 Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 185–86 (1990); see United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 
F.3d 1271, 1276 (11th Cir. 2003) (“A traffic stop based on an officer’s incorrect but reasonable 
assessment of facts does not violate the Fourth Amendment.”).   
116 See, e.g., United States v. Lang, 81 F.3d 955, 966 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that an officer’s 
mistake of identity was reasonable under the circumstances); United States v. Hatley, 15 F.3d 856, 859 
(9th Cir. 1994) (holding that, for the purposes of the vehicle exception, it was reasonable for officers to 
believe that a particular car was mobile in light of the circumstances); United States v. Gonzalez, 969 
F.2d 999, 1005 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding that an officer’s mistake of identity could be reasonable under 
the circumstance). 
117 113 Eng. Rep. 1036 (1841). 
118 Id. at 1040. 
119 Id.   
120 See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2434 (2011) (affirming denial of a motion to 
suppress when an officer reasonably relied on subsequently overturned appellate precedent); Illinois v. 
Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 359–61 (1987) (refusing to apply the exclusionary rule where an officer 
reasonably relied on a statute that was subsequently held unconstitutional); United States v. Leon, 468 
U.S. 897, 926 (1984) (declining exclusion where an officer reasonably relied on a magistrate’s 
incorrect determination of probable cause); Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 40 (1979) (declining 
exclusion where an officer reasonably relied on an ordinance later held unconstitutional).   
121 443 U.S. 31 (1979). 
122 Id. at 40. 
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case, an officer searched an individual incident to an arrest.123 However, 
the law that the individual allegedly violated (leading to the arrest) was 
later found to be unconstitutional.124 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court 
concluded that the search was not unlawful because “the officer’s 
assumption that the law was valid was reasonable.”125 The Court reasoned 
that “there was no controlling precedent that [the] ordinance was or was 
not constitutional, and hence the conduct observed violated a 
presumptively valid ordinance.”126 
Police officers are faced with difficult conditions every day, many of 
which arise with little to no warning. Mistakes of fact are tolerated because 
of these ambiguous and often dangerous situations.127 For officers to 
ensure the public’s safety and enforce the law, they must act quickly and 
decisively. They must assess unfolding situations in real-time, without the 
benefit of unlimited time and resources.  
It is unrealistic to assume that an officer will be able to clarify his 
interpretation of a law while in the field. This is especially true when the 
particular law at issue is complicated, ambiguous, or unsettled. When 
considering whether to pull over a suspect who zooms by on the highway, 
an officer cannot be expected to first consult an attorney or other “legal 
technician”128 to verify that the suspect did indeed commit a traffic 
violation.129   
In light of the “rapidly unfolding and often dangerous situations on city 
streets,” officers need a certain amount of discretion to allow them to take 
“necessarily swift action predicated upon . . . on-the-spot observations.”130 
Thus, great deference is given to the judgment of trained law enforcement 
                                                                                                                          
123 Id. at 33–35. 
124 Id. 
125 Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 538 (2014) (citing DeFillippo, 443 U.S. at 37). 
126 DeFillippo, 443 U.S. at 37. In the Heien decision, the Court compared the situation in 
DeFillippo with that of Heien by emphasizing the fact that “[t]he officers were wrong in concluding 
that DeFillippo was guilty of a criminal offense . . . [in that] DeFillipo’s conduct was lawful when the 
officers observed it”—since the law was eventually declared unconstitutional. Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 538. 
However, as the dissent points out, unlike in DeFillippo—where the police officer correctly applied the 
law that was then in existence, “police stopped Heien on suspicion of committing an offense that never 
actually existed.” Id. at 546 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (noting that “it would have been wrong for [the] 
officer [in DeFillippo] not to enforce the law in that situation); see DeFillippo, 443 U.S. at 38 (“Society 
would be ill-served if its police officers took it upon themselves to determine which laws are and which 
are not constitutionally entitled to enforcement.”). 
127 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949) (“Because many situations which confront 
officers in the course of executing their duties are more or less ambiguous, room must be allowed for 
some mistakes on their part.”). 
128 Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695–96 (1996).  
129 Consultations in any form take time, which officers may not always have, especially in 
situations that call for an immediate response. Further, officers may be unaware that a law is unsettled 
or ambiguous until the case is brought to court.  
130 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 10, 20 (1968).   
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officers “on the scene.”131 Contrary to Heien’s argument, police discretion 
plays a crucial role in our justice system. Society benefits from the 
humanization of law enforcement. When investigating potentially unlawful 
conduct, police officers can take into account circumstances that the 
legislature may not have considered when drafting the relevant statute.132 
Affording police greater discretion promotes fairness by allowing officers 
to make ad hoc decisions based on the actual situation in front of them. 
While investigatory traffic stops may not present the same urgency as 
other police encounters, they are essential to law enforcement. Permitting 
officers to stop vehicles for minor traffic violations keeps the roadways 
safe and provides police with invaluable opportunities to thwart more 
serious criminal activity. For example, in July of this year, a serial bank 
robber was captured after a police officer stopped him for a broken tail 
light.133 While the occasional reasonable mistake of law may lead to the 
inconvenience of a few innocent drivers, society benefits substantially 
from the reduction of crime in general.  
But are traffic stops really just an “inconvenience?” As Justice 
Sotomayor noted in her dissent, traffic stops can be “annoying, frightening, 
and perhaps humiliating.”134 Nonetheless, courts afford a certain amount of 
flexibility when it comes to fact assessments made by police officers 
because of the need for on-the-fly decisions.135 Officers are better trained 
and better positioned than courts to make those quick, ad hoc judgments.136 
The reasonableness of factual determinations rests on the facts as they are 
known to the officers as well as inferences and deductions drawn by those 
officers.137 However, there are fundamental doctrinal and practical 
differences between law and facts.138 Unlike factual determinations, legal 
determinations need not—and should not—be made on an impromptu 
                                                                                                                          
131 Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 205 (2001); cf. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 n.23 
(1984) (noting that public officials enjoy qualified immunity in suits seeking damages for deprivations 
of constitutional rights).   
132 See Harold E. Pepinsky, Better Living Through Police Discretion, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 249, 265 (1984) (“Application of rules requires (a) that inferences be drawn from information 
received (e.g., as to whether complainants are telling the truth), and (b) that the rules be interpreted in 
light of unforeseeable ambiguities presented by idiosyncratic encounters.”).   
133 Neil Remiesiewicz, Police Hunch Leads to Arrest in Pair of Bank Robberies, WPRI 
EYEWITNESS NEWS (July 12, 2014, 12:37 PM), http://wpri.com/2014/07/12/police-investigating-pair-
of-bank-robberies/. 
134 Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 543 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Terry, 392 U.S. at 25). 
135 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949). 
136 Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 543 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“When officers evaluate unfolding 
circumstances, they deploy that expertise to draw ‘conclusions about human behavior’ much in the way 
that ‘jurors [do] as factfinders.’”) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981)). 
137 Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996).  
138 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 37, at 19–22. 
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basis.139 As the dissenting judge in the North Carolina Supreme Court 
decision explained, “[i]t is the legislature’s job to write the law . . . . The 
job of the police is to enforce the law as it has been written by the 
legislature and interpreted by the courts.”140 In any given encounter, the 
facts may change, but the law remains the same. In fact, “‘the notion that 
the law is definite and knowable’ sits at the foundation of our legal 
system.”141   
The Supreme Court has held that the determination of reasonable 
suspicion is a combination of law and fact. Specifically, “[t]he historical 
facts are admitted or established, the rule of law is undisputed, and the 
issue is whether the facts satisfy the [relevant] statutory [or constitutional] 
standard.”142 To gauge the reasonableness of a search or seizure, the facts 
surrounding the Fourth Amendment encounter must be measured against 
the relevant law. Practically speaking, it is impossible to weigh the facts 
ascertained by the police officer against the pertinent legal standard if the 
pertinent legal standard is not interpreted accurately. As such, the Court’s 
method of determining reasonable suspicion does not allow for mistakes of 
law.  
Of course, distinguishing between mistakes of fact and mistakes of law 
is not always easy. What constitutes a mistake of fact versus a mistake of 
law is often difficult to identify, especially when the distinction must be 
made in the field. For instance, suppose a statute forbids “excessively 
cracked windshields” and an officer stops a vehicle with what he thinks is 
a seven-to-ten inch crack in the windshield.143 If it is determined that the 
seven-to-ten inch crack did not violate the statute, did the officer make a 
mistake of fact or a mistake of law? Should the distinction (if one exists) 
matter—so long as the officer’s actions were reasonable? Based on the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Heien, the answer is “no.” But why? 
                                                                                                                          
139 The majority opinion, however, concluded otherwise.  
[A]n officer may ‘suddenly confront’ a situation in the field as to which the 
application of a statute is unclear—however clear it may later become. A law 
prohibiting ‘vehicles’ in the park either covers Segways or not, . . . but an officer 
will nevertheless have to make a quick decision on the law the first time one 
whizzes by.  
Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 539 (citation omitted). 
140 Heien II, 737 S.E.2d 351, 362 (N.C. 2012)(Hudson, J., dissenting); see Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 
543 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is courts, not officers, that are in the best position to interpret the 
laws.”). 
141 Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 543 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 
192, 199 (1991). 
142 Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 696 (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).   
143 See United States v. Cashman, 216 F.3d 582, 586–87 (7th Cir. 2000) (discussing an officer’s 
interpretation of an excessively cracked windshield and whether it was correct).   
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IV. THE DECISION 
The question that faced the Supreme Court in Heien v. North Carolina 
was whether a mistake of law could provide the requisite reasonable 
suspicion to justify a traffic stop.144 The majority opinion, however, recast 
the issue as “whether reasonable suspicion can rest on a mistaken 
understanding of the scope of a legal prohibition.”145 While the Court’s 
wording may just be semantics, it does suggest that it was looking for a 
way to make the decision seem less ominous.146    
Referencing the infamous Ginsburg quote,147 the Court declared, “[t]o 
be reasonable is not to be perfect, and so the Fourth Amendment allows for 
some mistakes on the part of government officials, giving them ‘fair 
leeway for enforcing the law in the community’s protection.’”148 It cited 
several situations where searches or seizures were found to be reasonable 
despite being based on mistakes of fact.149 Recognizing that “reasonable 
men make mistakes of law, too,”150 the Court determined that mistakes of 
law should be given the same treatment as those of fact.151 Specifically, the 
Court reasoned that “[w]hether the facts turn out to be not what was 
thought, or the law turns out to be not what was thought, the result is the 
same: the facts are outside the scope of the law.”152    
While that reasoning is sound, it ignores the fundamental concerns 
raised by Heien and the dissent. Even if the result of the two mistakes is 
the same, facts and law are not the same. While there is not much an 
innocent citizen can do about an officer’s mistaken interpretation of facts, 
he should be able to avoid a negative encounter with law enforcement by 
                                                                                                                          
144 Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 534. 
145 Id. at 536 (emphasis added). 
146 The Court seemed to be emphasizing that the officer merely got the “scope” of the law wrong 
rather than making up the law completely. While that is true in this case, it may not always be.   
147 “The ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness.’” Id. (quoting Riley v. 
California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
148 Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 536 (citing Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949)). 
149 Id. (“The warrantless search of a home . . . is reasonable if undertaken with the consent of a 
resident, and remains lawful when officers obtain the consent of someone who reasonably appears to be 
but is not in fact a resident. . . . By the same token, if officers with probable cause to arrest a suspect 
mistakenly arrest an individual matching the suspect’s description, neither the seizure nor an 
accompanying search of the arrestee would be unlawful.”) (citation omitted). 
150 Id. 
151 The majority opinion actually did cite some older cases where courts found that mistakes of 
law could provide “reasonable cause” (a synonym for probable cause). Specifically, the Court relied on 
United States v. Riddle, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 311 (1809). In that case, goods were seized from an English 
shipper on the ground that it had violated the customs laws by undervaluing the merchandise on an 
invoice. Id. Chief Justice Marshall upheld the seizure even after concluding that there had been no 
violation of the customs law because “the construction of the law was liable to some question.” Id. at 
313 (“A doubt as to the true construction of the law is as reasonable a cause for seizure as a doubt 
respecting the fact.”).  
152 Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 536. 
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proactively following the law. As Justice Sotomayor recognized, under the 
majority’s opinion, “[o]ne wonders how a citizen seeking to be law-
abiding and to structure his or her behavior to avoid these invasive, 
frightening, and humiliating encounters could do so.”153 Civilians would be 
left with the impossible task of predicting and abiding by every 
misinterpretation of every traffic law, which may or may not exist, to avoid 
being pulled over, which the Court has recognized is a substantial 
infringement on an individual’s liberty.154  
This reality presents a litany of questions. Is it reasonable for an officer 
to rely on a misprint of a statute? Or on a statute that was already declared 
unconstitutional? Does it matter how long it has been unconstitutional? A 
month? A year? Is it reasonable to assume a particular law exists when it in 
fact does not? What if a similar law exists? How similar must it be?155   
“Giving officers license to effect seizures so long as they can attach to 
their reasonable view of the facts some reasonable legal interpretation (or 
misinterpretation) that suggests a law has been violated significantly 
expands [their] authority”156 and discourages officers from learning the 
law.157 Without some retroactive check on police conduct, there is “little 
incentive to err on the side of constitutional behavior.”158 “Official 
awareness of the dubious constitutionality of a practice would be 
counterbalanced by official certainty that, so long as the Fourth 
Amendment law in the area remained unsettled, evidence obtained through 
the questionable practice would be excluded only in the one case 
definitively resolving the unsettled question.”159  
If courts allow mistakes of law, officers will likely choose to stop 
drivers even in situations where they are unsure that a law actually 
prohibits the drivers’ conduct, on the off chance that some statute can later 
be mistakenly construed to sanction the stop. While this may not seem 
outrageous in the instance of Sergeant Darisse’s “reasonable” belief that 
the law required two functioning brake lights, it will set a precedent that 
will encourage officers to broadly interpret the traffic code to the extent 
                                                                                                                          
153 Id. at 544 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
154 See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 817 (1996) (noting that “even ordinary traffic stops 
entail a possibly unsettling show of authority; . . . interfere with freedom of movement, are 
inconvenient, and consume time[;] and . . . may create substantial anxiety” (citations omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).   
155 See Heien II, 737 S.E.2d 351, 360 (N.C. 2012) (Hudson, J., dissenting) (recognizing the danger 
in adopting this rule as it will extend to cases where “the officer acts based on a misreading of a less 
innocuous statute, or an innocent memo or training program from the police department, or his or her 
previous law enforcement experience in a different state, or his or her belief in a nonexistent law”).    
156 Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 543 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
157 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 37, at 35–36. 
158 Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2435 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citation 
omitted).   
159 United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 561 (1982).   
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that any “reasonable” reading of any law—even if incorrect—could justify 
reasonable suspicion.160  
The majority opinion claims that the decision “does not discourage 
officers from learning the law [because] . . . . [t]he Fourth Amendment 
tolerates only reasonable mistakes, and those mistakes—whether of fact or 
of law—must be objectively reasonable.”161 Indeed, there is no question 
that it is unreasonable for officers to be completely ignorant of the laws 
that they enforce. However, when an officer reasonably interprets an 
unsettled law, the search or seizure may be lawful. In these cases, officers 
are aware of the law and believe that their enforcement is authorized. The 
complicated or ambiguous nature of the law is what makes the officer’s 
actions reasonable.162 In cases where an officer is truly ignorant of a settled 
law, the search or seizure would be deemed unreasonable and therefore a 
violation of the Fourth Amendment.   
Ultimately, the majority agreed with North Carolina, holding that 
reasonable “mistake[s] of law . . . can give rise to the reasonable suspicion 
necessary to uphold the seizure under the Fourth Amendment.”163 Thus, 






                                                                                                                          
160 See Barlow v. United States, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 404, 411 (1833) (Story, J.) (“There is scarcely 
any law which does not admit of some ingenious doubt. . . .”). 
161 Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 539. 
162 Id. at 541 (Kagan, J., concurring) (“If the statute is genuinely ambiguous, such that overturning 
the officer’s judgment requires hard interpretive work, then the officer has made a reasonable mistake.  
But if not, not.”). 
163 Id. at 534 (majority opinion). 
164 Id. at 540. The Court concluded that the conflicting language of the North Carolina statute 
made it reasonable for Officer Darisse to conclude that the faulty brake light was a violation of North 
Carolina law. Id. Specifically, it explained: 
Although the North Carolina statute at issue refers to “a stop lamp,” suggesting the 
need for only a single working brake light, it also provides that “[t]he stop lamp may 
be incorporated into a unit with one or more other rear lamps.” The use of “other” 
suggests to the everyday reader of English that a “stop lamp” is a type of “rear 
lamp.” And another subsection of the same provision requires that vehicles “have all 
originally equipped rear lamps or the equivalent in good working order,” arguably 
indicating that if a vehicle has multiple “stop lamp[s],” all must be functional. . . . 
[Since] the “rear lamps” discussed in subsection (d) do not include brake lights, but, 
given the “other,” it would at least have been reasonable to think they did. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
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V.  RENEWING WHREN: “DRIVING WHILE BLACK” AFTER HEIEN 
While North Carolina conceded that cases in which a mistake could be 
excused (like Sergeant Darisse’s) would be “exceedingly rare,”165 how 
often would a mistake even be presented for review? It is not the 
occasional individual injustice due to a mistake of law that is troubling. It 
is the overall effect of the outright expansion of police discretion. Justice 
Sotomayor voiced this concern in her dissent, contending that the 
majority’s decision “further erod[es] the Fourth Amendment’s protection 
of civil liberties in a context where that protection has already been worn 
down.”166  
There is no dispute that minority drivers are more likely to be stopped 
on a roadway than Caucasian drivers.167 Due to “the so-called war on 
drugs,” racial profiling has been a very real issue for decades.168 A few 
years ago rapper Jay-Z memorialized this harsh reality in his song, “99 
Problems.”169 In the song, Jay-Z is pulled over on the New Jersey Turnpike 
and the officer asks “Son do you know why I’m stopping you for?”170 To 
which Jay-Z answered, “Cause I’m young and I’m black and my hat’s real 
low.”171 Truth be told, Jay-Z was probably right. According to a study of 
the New Jersey Turnpike during the 1990s (around the time that the stop in 
the song occurred), “African-American motorists made up 35% of all 
traffic stops and 73% of all arrests, even though they represented only an 
estimated 13% of drivers.”172 Additionally, black drivers are searched 
                                                                                                                          
165 Id. at 541 (Kagan, J., concurring) (citing Brief for the Respondent, supra note 80, at 17).  
166 Id. at 543 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
167 Especially in North Carolina. See Jim Wise, Durham Study Supports Traffic-Stop Disparity 
Claims, DURHAM NEWS (Sept. 26, 2013), www.thedurhamnews.com/ 2013/09/26/ 3230249_durham-
numbers-support-traffic.html (“[T]he numbers show that a black or Hispanic motorist is 77 percent 
more likely to be searched after a traffic stop than a white driver.”).   
168 See David A. Harris, Driving While Black: Racial Profiling On Our Nation’s Highways, 
ACLU: SPECIAL REPORT, June 7, 1999, available at https://www.aclu.org/racial-justice/driving-while-
black-racial-profiling-our-nations-highways (explaining that racial profiling became especially 
prevalent in the 1980s due to the so-called “war on drugs”).   
169 JAY-Z, 99 PROBLEMS (Roc-A-Fella/Def Jam 2004). 
170 Id. 
171 Id. While Jay-Z’s words may be true, they are also part of the problem because they reinforce 
the stigma. Racial profiling is the result of self-perpetuating racial inequality. Glenn Loury, an 
economist and author of The Anatomy of Racial Inequality, puts the problem in the context of taxi 
drivers. Loury proposes a hypothetical in which taxi drivers do not stop for blacks because blacks are 
robbers. GLENN C. LOURY, THE ANATOMY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY 30–31 (2002). Blacks know that 
drivers are unlikely to stop for them. Id. So only black robbers (who do not mind waiting since they 
plan on robbing whoever stops anyway) take taxis. Id. This reinforces the driver’s belief since it is now 
more likely that a black rider is a robber. Id. Ironically, Chris Rock’s latest movie includes a scene 
where the main character, a black man, tries to prove to his friend that cabs never stop for black men. 
TOP FIVE (Paramount Pictures 2014). But as soon as he raises his hand, a cab immediately pulls up next 
to him. Id.  
172 Kimberly D. Dodson & Randal Sluss, Police Practices of the North Carolina Highway Patrol:  
Do Police Target Minorities?, 10 L. ENFORCEMENT EXECUTIVE F. 55, 56 (2010), available at 
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twice as often as white drivers after being stopped.173  
This disparity in traffic stop statistics among races is unsurprising, 
especially in light of the Supreme Court’s holding in Whren v. United 
States.174 In Whren, the Court explicitly sanctioned pretextual traffic stops, 
holding that an officer’s discriminatory motivations for pulling over a 
vehicle are irrelevant for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment.175 
Specifically, the Court made it clear that “[s]ubjective intentions play no 
role” in the evaluation of the legality of a traffic stop.176 It held that, despite 
the potentially unconstitutional intentions of the officer, there was no 
Fourth Amendment violation because the officer had probable cause to 
believe that the driver had violated the traffic code.177   
However, the Court assumed in Whren that “when an officer acts on 
pretext, at least that pretext would be the violation of an actual law.”178 In 
United States v. Chanthasouxat,179 the Eleventh Circuit explained the 
effect of the Whren Court’s decision on Fourth Amendment jurisprudence:  
“The rule [set out] in Whren provides law enforcement officers broad 
leeway to conduct searches and seizures regardless of whether their 
subjective intent corresponds to the legal justifications for their actions. 
But the flip side of that leeway is that the legal justifications must be 
objectively grounded.”180 Thus—after Whren—police discretion to stop 
and search was at least limited to situations where an actual violation of the 
law occurred. Now—after Heien—the Supreme Court has essentially given 
police officers permission to hide their impermissible motives behind 
artificial legal justifications in addition to false factual determinations.    
Undeniably, individuals who believe they have been discriminated 
against have the right to sue under the Equal Protection Clause.181 
However, having the right to bring an equal protection claim and the 
ability to bring one are not the same. In order to bring an equal protection 
claim against a police officer, the individual must prove that the officer 
                                                                                                                          
http://www.academia.edu/4022380/Police_Practices_of_the_North_Carolina 
_Highway_Patrol_Do_Police_Target_Minorities (last visited Jan. 17, 2015). 
173 Wise, supra note 167.   
174 517 U.S. 806 (1996). 
175 Id. at 818–19.   
176 Id. at 813.   
177 Id. at 818; Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1416 (2013) (“[A] stop or search that is 
objectively reasonable is not vitiated by the fact that the officer’s real reason for making the stop or 
search has nothing to do with the validating reason.” (emphasis omitted)).   
178 Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 543 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (emphasis 
added); see Whren, 517 U.S. at 818 (noting that the “infraction itself [is] . . . the ordinary measure of 
the lawfulness of enforcement”). 
179 342 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir. 2003). 
180 Id. at 1279 (emphasis added). 
181 Whren, 517 U.S. at 813 (“[T]he constitutional basis for objecting to intentionally 
discriminatory application of laws is the Equal Protection Clause.”). 
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intentionally discriminated against him based on race, or some other 
protected status.182 In other words, the claimant must prove that a similarly 
situated individual (of a different race, etc.) would have been stopped for 
the same traffic offense but was not.183 This is particularly difficult 
considering officers tend to keep records only of drivers they stopped, not 
of those they chose not to.184 Without the ability to look inside the mind of 
the officer involved, it is nearly impossible to prove discriminatory 
intent.185 Even if the claimant is able to establish a constitutional violation, 
the officer may be entitled to qualified immunity.186 
Ironically, the majority opinion in Heien emphasized that the inquiry 
into whether an officer’s mistake of law is objectively reasonable “is not as 
forgiving as the one employed in the distinct context of deciding whether 
an officer is entitled to qualified immunity for a constitutional or statutory 
violation.”187 Apparently, an innocent individual, who is mistakenly 
stopped and wants to allege discrimination by the officer, is faced with a 
higher burden of proof than a criminal who merely wants evidence 
suppressed. Given the higher burden of proof and the time and money it 
takes to bring a civil action, the only individuals who could fight back 
against racial discrimination by police officers are arguably “bad guys.” 
And because the defendants are “bad guys” and police officers are now 
(thanks to Heien) permitted to stop vehicles for any (reasonable) reason, 
judges will more than likely absolve the officer from blame, perpetuating 
the problem.188   
The Heien court’s decision to allow mistakes of law to justify 
                                                                                                                          
182 Kenneth Gavsie, Making the Best of “Whren”: The Problems with Pretextual Traffic Stops 
and the Need for Restraint, 50 FLA. L. REV. 385, 393 (1998). 
183 Id. (“[A]n African-American motorist would have to show that a white motorist was observed 
by an officer committing the same violation under similar circumstances, yet was not stopped.”).  
184 Id.; see Wise, supra note 167 (noting that North Carolina was one of the first states to enact 
legislation that requires law enforcement agencies to collect and report racial and ethnic data for traffic 
stops). 
185 See Gavsie, supra note 182, at 393–94 (noting that “short of an officer admitting he stopped a 
driver because of race, raising a successful equal protection challenge will be a near impossibility”).   
186 Kit Kinports, Qualified Immunity in Section 1983 Cases: The Unanswered Questions, 23 GA. 
L. REV. 597, 600–01 (1989). 
187 Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 539 (2014); see Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 
2085 (2011) (“Qualified immunity gives government officials breathing room to make reasonable but 
mistaken judgments about open legal questions.”). 
188 With the help of the judiciary, racial profiling has become “a self-fulfilling prophecy.” Harris, 
supra note 168. 
Because police look for drugs primarily among African Americans and Latinos, they 
find a disproportionate number of them with contraband. Therefore, more minorities 
are arrested, prosecuted, convicted, and jailed, thus reinforcing the perception that 
drug trafficking is primarily a minority activity. This perception creates the profile 
that results in more stops of minority drivers. . . . And so the cycle continues. 
Id. 
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reasonable suspicion essentially gives officers carte blanche to stop 
individuals based on whatever subjective criteria they see fit, promoting 
racial profiling and further increasing the distrust of law enforcement 
officers among minorities. In “99 Problems,” Jay-Z was describing the 
conditions on the New Jersey Turnpike in 1994 (two years before the 
Whren decision).189 Nearly twenty years later, the Supreme Court seems to 
be moving in the wrong direction.  
Racial profiling has arguably escalated from being an inconvenience 
for black drivers to a death sentence. Indeed, according to a report issued 
by the Justice Department investigating law enforcement practices in 
Ferguson, Missouri, racial bias and stereotyping “severely damaged the 
relationship between African Americans and the Ferguson Police 
Department long before Michael Brown’s shooting death in August 
2014.”190 The report “give[s] the context for the shooting, describing the 
mounting sense of frustration and anger in a predominantly black city 
where the police department and local government are mostly white.”191 
Specifically, the Justice Department accused the Ferguson Police 
Department of engaging in a pattern of discriminatory stops and arrests of 
African Americans without reasonable suspicion or probable cause and 
then relying on fines for missed court appearances and traffic tickets to 
balance the city’s budget.192 The report concluded that these unlawful 
practices “are directly shaped and perpetuated by racial bias.”193 According 
to the New York Times, the Ferguson report is “the last in a long string of 
civil rights investigations into police departments” since 2009.194 In light of 
this climate, it is a bit disheartening that the Court made no effort to 
address the racial implications of its decision in Heien.195   
 
                                                                                                                          
189 JAY-Z, DECODED 207 (2010). 
190 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT 79 (2015) 
[hereinafter FERGUSON REPORT]. 
191 Matt Apuzzo, Justice Report to Fault Bias by Ferguson, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2015, at A1 
(citing to “several officials who have been briefed on the report’s conclusions.”).   
192 FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 190, at 2–4. For example, from 2012 to 2014 “African 
Americans account for 85% of vehicle stops, 90% of citations and 93% of arrests made by [Ferguson 
Police Department] officers, despite comprising only 67% of Ferguson’s population.” Id. at 4.  
193 Id. 4–5 (“Our investigation indicates that this disproportionate burden on African Americans 
cannot be explained by any difference in the rate at which people of different races violate the law.  
Rather, our investigation has revealed that theses disparities occur, at least in part, because of unlawful 
bias against and stereotypes about African Americans.”). 
194 Apuzzo, supra note 191. 
195 However, Justice Sotomayor in her dissent did mention the “human consequences—including 
those for communities and for their relationships with the police.” Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 
530, 544 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
There is no question that the failed indictments of the officers in 
Ferguson and Staten Island have revived the debate over racial 
discrimination by law enforcement. Handed down just weeks later, the 
Heien decision will add fuel to the fire. After Heien, officers will be 
permitted to conduct searches and seizures so long as they can cite some 
reasonable legal interpretation (or misinterpretation) that suggests that a 
law has been broken. This expansion of police authority will 
disproportionately affect minorities, who are already singled out by law 
enforcement. While the Court is confident that very few mistakes of law 
will ultimately be upheld, “the Court’s unwillingness to sketch a fuller 
view of what makes a mistake of law reasonable only presages the likely 
difficulty that courts will have applying the Court’s decision.”196 For the 
time being, it seems as if we are left with no answer to the ominous 




                                                                                                                          
196 Id. at 547. 
